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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
.Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

MARION H. CHRISTENSEN and

9544

RINTHA G. CHRISTENSEN, his
wife,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above entitled case is brought before this Court
for its consideration by an appeal of th·e State of Utah,
acting through its Road Commission, from the judgment
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and order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and
for Utah County. The case was initiated by the State
of Utah, under its inherent power of eminent domain to
acquire property of the respondents for the construction
of a state highway facility in Utah County.

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Joseph E. Nelson presiding, on the 8th day of March,
1961, entered judgment against the State of Utah and
in favor of the respondents in the sum of $5,500.00, as
compensation. The State of Utah on March 17, 1961,
moved the lower court for a remittitur of the verdict
and, in the alternative, a new trial; the said court, on
May 15th, 1961, denied both motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT
It is submitted, by this appeal, that the judgment
of the District Court should be reversed and the case
remanded for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACT.S
On January 18, 1960, the State Road Commission
of Utah filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court
for Utah County to acquire, by eminent domain pro ..
cesses, real property o'vned by the respondents herein,
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Marion H. Christensen and Rintha G. Christensen, his
"·ife, said property being situated in An1erican Fork
City, and being more particularly described in the complaint as Parcel No. 15-6:272:A (R. 3). An answer was
filed (R. 14) by the respondents on October 13, 1960,
thereby setting the case at issue for trial. The questions
relative to jurisdiction, public use and necessity, and
the right to condemn were admitted by the respondents
(R. 14), and the only issue before the court was the
amount of compensation to be paid to the respondents
for the acquisition of their property interests (R. 17).
On l\larch 6, 1961, the issues were joined and a trial had,
before a jury of eight, with respect to (1) the fair market value of the land acquired and (2) the damages accruing to the remaining property of respondents, caused
by the severanc€l of the portion expropriated and the construction of the public improvement in the manner proposed (R. 75). On March 8, 1961, the jury returned its
verdict against the State of Utah and in favor of the
respondents in the following amounts:
( 1) The value of the 0.54 acre of land as

of January 18, 1960 ·················-·············-····----------·$1,080.00
(2) Severance damages ································-··········-···· 4,420.00
TOTAL VERDICT ·····························-------------------$5,500.00
(R. 75.)

The total tract of the respondents, prior to the expropriation, constituted 1.10 acres ( Tr. 9), of which
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0.54 acre was acquired by the State of Utah for the
highway facility (Tr. 9).
After the jury was empaneled and opening arguments presented by counsel, the jury was permitted to
view the premises acquired by the appellant and the
Christensen land remaining (Tr. 15, Line 20). Among
those present at the time the jury viewed the premises
were the Christensens, their attorneys, the bailiff and
deputy sheriff, and attorneys for the State of Utah (R.
83). During the course of the jury view, Rintha G. Christensen, one of the respondents, addressed the jury orally
and informed them that" it was difficult to see the property being taken by the State of Utah (the highway being
at that time partially constructed) and the remaining
property (R. 83); further, that the jury could not get
an entire picture of the sheep operation that the respondents conducted and that it was much prettier in the
springtime when the ''cute'' little lambs were in the pasture area (R. 84). Mr. Aldrich, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, one of the attorney.s for the State of
Utah, informed Mrs. Christensen that the law did not
permit the jury to be addressed by the landowner during
the view''to which Mrs. Christensen replied in contexthow was the jury to realize the extent to whieh
she and her husband had been hurt if she didn't
explain to the jury what they had before the highway was constructed and what they had thereafter.''
(R. 84.)
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Thereafter, ~lrs. Christensen attempted to answer a
question asked by an individual juror and Mr. Aldrich
again informed her that only the bailiff should respond
to the question (R. 84).
At the trial of the matter, after the respondents
had rested their case in chief, the State of Utah called
Wilbur Harding of American Fork to testify ( Tr. 165).
After being qualified, Mr. Harding testified that the
value of the 0.54 acre being acquired by the State of
Utah was $1,080.00 (Tr. 178, Line 17), that severance
damage was $420.00 (Tr. 178, Line 24), and that total
compensation approximated $1,500.00 (Tr. 179, Line 1).
The value of the land expropriated by the State of Utah
was based upon a computation of $2,000 per acre (Tr.
180, Line 6), the highest and best use being residential
(Tr. 172, Line 15). The opinion of Mr. Harding, in connection with the value of the land actually taken was
identical to that of the three witnesses who appeared in
behalf of the respondents-Denzil A. Brown (Tr. 57),
Milton Harrison (Tr. 90, Line 17), and Afton Payne
(Tr. 122, Line 14).
On cross examination, J. Rulon Morgan, attorney
for respondents, asked Mr. Harding if it were not true
that the owner of property, immediately to the west of
Christensens, had been paid severance damage of
$3,500.00 by the State, due to proximity of the new highway (Tr. 200). The lower court allowed the witness to
answer, over objection, whereupon Mr. Harding anS\Yered he did not know (Tr. 200). Thereafter, counsel
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for respondents continued his inquiry into the amount
of severance damage paid in the amicable settlement with
the property owner on the West. Specifically, the transcript reveals that the following examination was conducted:
MR. MORGAN:
'' Q.

is it

This is going to be a six-lane freeway,

not~

"A.

That's right.

'' Q. Has there been any traffic on this highway so far, other than construction equipment,
so far as you know~
"A. N o, s1r.
.

"Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Harding, that the
estate right next to this property line just to the
west, that there was a severance of $3500.00 paid
to that o·wn-er because of proximity of this high~vay?

"MR. ALDRICH: Your Honor, what has
been paid or what might be paid in some other
case has1 no /bearing in this case, and it's improper.
"The COURT:
ahead.

I'll let him ans,Yer.

Go

''THE 'VITNESS: A. I don't know.
BY !!R. MORGAN:

''Q. Have you inquired to the west, as to
how tnuch they got for proximity of the highu,ay
to their home?
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"MR. ALDRICH: I have a continuing objection to all of this line of testimony, because this
is highly prejudicial.
"TIIE COURT: You may. The objection
is sustained. You 1nay proceed.
BY MR. MORGAN:
'' Q. Did you app1·aise the p1·operty on the
west that I have referred to?

''A.

Yes.

'' Q.

For the State?

''A. I did.
'' Q. What was your appraisal to the property on the west¥
1\tiR. CAMPBELL: We are going to object
to this line of testimony.

''THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR.

~fORGAN:

'' Q. Was there any severance damage to
this property to the west~''
(Tr. 200-201. Empasis added.)

It was the testimony of the respondents, during their
case in chief, that the subject property, as of the date
of condemnation, was zoned so that the sheep operation
conducted on the property of the respondents constituted
a non-conforming use (Tr. 46, L. 18) (Tr. 110, L. 29)
(Tr. 136).
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During the presentation of its case, the State of
Utah attempted to adduce testimony from its witnesses
that the zoning ordinances of American Fork City, at
the date of condemnation, did not prohibit the use of
respondents' property for a sheep operation, but that
between the date of condemnation and the date of trial,
the ordinances of American Fork City were altered,
modified, and thereafter specified that the utilization of
respondents' property as a sheep operation was a nonconforming use (Tr.174-175; Tr. 222, Line 12). An offer
of proof was made by the State of Utah (Tr. 176, Line
1). The court sustained an objection to the admissibility
of testimony concerning the ordinances (Tr. 176, Line
9; Tr. 222, Line 15).
The court, in its Instruction No. 7 to the jury, directed that it might consider severance damage to the
remaining land. The court then suggested several items
which, in its opinion, constituted severance damage, such
as irregular or inconvenient shape of the remaining land,
cutting off access to a highway, annoyances from noise,
vibrations, dust, odors, obstruction of view, and lessened
value of the remainder as a site for the purposes for
which the land "ras being used (R. 61). The jury was
further directed that it should take into consideration
the use of the re1naining land of respondents for pasturing, protection of sheep and for shearing and lan1bing,
in connection "Ti th the owners' sheep business operation
(R. 61).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
STATEMENTS l\1ADE BY THE LANDOWNER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
JURY, DURING THEIR VIEW OF THE
CONDEMNED PREMISES, WERE PREJUDICIAL AND INF,LAMMATORY AND PREVENTED THE STATE OF UTAH FROM OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
TRIAL.
POINT II
QUESTIONS ASKED BY COUNSEL FOR
RESPONDENTS ON CROSS- EXAMINATION OF WILBUR HARDING, WITH RESPECT TO SEVERANCE DAMAGE PAID
BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANOTHER
LANDOWNER ALONG· THE SAME HIGHWAY PROJECT, WERE PREJUDICIAL
AND INFLAMMATORY, AND THE STATE
OF UTAH WAS THEREBY DENIED A
FAIR AND IMP ARTIAIJ TRIAL.
(A) The lower court committed prejudicial error

in overruling the
of Utah.

~initial

objection of the

(B) S'ltch questions were asked

Stat~e

vn

bad faith and
their prejudicial effect was not cured.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
POINT III
REFUSAL OF THE LOWER COURT TO
RECEIVE EVIDENCE, ON BEHALF OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, RELATING TO
ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AT OR ABOUT THE
DATE OF CONDEMNATION, vVAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
POINT IV
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT vv,.AS AN INCORRECT
·STATEMENT O:F' THE LAW AND CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATEMENTS ~1ADE BY THE LANDOWNER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
JURY, DURING THEIR VIE\V. OF THE
CONDEMNED PREMISES, ''TERE PREJUDICIAL AND INFLA~Ll\LA.TORY AND PREVENTED THE STATE OF UTAH FROl\I OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
TRIAL.
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The affidavit of Glen E. Faxon (R. 83) evidences
the fact that during the time the jury 'vas permitted to
see and vie\\' the premises involved, one of the landowners, Rintha G. Christensen, \\·as present and addressed
the jury at large, relative to the difficulty in appraising the gravity of the conditions caused by the highway development. This conduct upon the part of the
respondents is in direct transgression with the rule
of this Court and the case law in the United States.
Rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets out the
conditions and agendum under which the jury view shall
be conducted:
'' \Vhen in the opinion of the court it is proper
for the jury to have a view of the property which
is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which any material fact occurred, it may order
them to be conducted in a body under the charge
of an officer to the place, which shall be shown
to them by some person appointed by the court
for that purpose. While the jury are thus absent
no person other than the p.erson so appointed
shall speak to them on any subject connected 1oith
the t1~ial. '' (Emphasis added.)
Not only were the statements made by Rintha Christensen connected to the substantive issues of the trial,
but they 'vere directed to elements not compensable or
cognizable under the rules of eminent domain. The assertion of Mrs. Christensen impliedly indicated to the
jurors that the sheep business and operation conducted
by the landowners had been damaged by the expropria-
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tion of the State of Utah and signified that the operation, itself, was not as profitable as it had been prior to
the construction of the highway facility. With respect
thereto, the law is altogether clear that alleged loss of
profits is not a compensable factor to be considered.
Riddle v. State Highway Comm. of Kansas, 184 Kan.
603, 339 P. 2d 301 (1959); Dusevich v. Wisconsin Power
& Light Co., 260 Wis. 641, 51 N. W. 2d 732.
The leading object of a jury view is to provide aid
and assistance to the panel in order that the members
might better apprehend the testimony elicited at the
hearing. Weber Basi-n Water ·conservancy District v.
Moo.re, 2 U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954). The view does
not qualify as part of the evidentiary proceeding and
may not be utilized by the panel as independent evidence
in its deliberation. Redd v. Air~vay Motor Coach Lines,
104 U. 9, 137 P. 2d 374 (1943); P. A. Sorenson Co. v.
Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 49 U. 548, 164 P. 1020 (1917);
Bancroft Realty Co. v. Alencewicz, 7 N. J. Super. 105,
72 A. 2d 360; Tow~ end v. State of Wisconsin, 257 Wis.
329, 43 N. W. 2d 458: Dempsey-Vanderbilt Hotel v.
H~tisman, 153 Fla. 800, 15 So. 2d 903; v,..alenti v. Mayer,
301 Mich. 551, 4 N. W. 2d 5. The statement of the respondent was, therefore, improper by its very nature
and made at a time when the jury was under the strict
supervision and control of the bailiff (Tr. 15 ).
It is correct to say that during the period when the
jury visits the property, only the custodial officer or the
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court, itself, should speak to the members, answer their
questions, or point out physical features and characteristics of the land. Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198
S. E. 441 (1938). The fact that Mr. Aldrich, attorney
for the State of Utah, 'vas required to advise Mrs. Christensen to refrain from speaking with the jury ere a ted
an undue and unjustified feeling of sympathy and emotion in favor of the landowners. It could well have been
reasoned by the members of the jury that it was enough
that the State of Utah take the respondents' property
involuntarily, without the additional fact of preventing
Mrs. Christensen from making a statement with relation
thereto. That Mr. Aldrich was obliged to admonish the
landowner not to answer a question of a juror at the
view, produced further seeds of sympathy in favor of
the landowners and bias against the State of Utah. The
authorities in this country sustain the rule that an improper statement made by a party to a juror, during
the course of the jury view, will serve as grounds for
a new trial if such statement relates to a substantial
issue in the case. In Yeary v. Holbrook, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said:
''If the jurors, or any one of them, listen to
a statement (not argument of counsel) of a person made to them about a material matter in the
trial of the case when such person is not on the
witness stand, the conduct is improper, and \Vigmore savs it violates the rule against hearsay.
And, fu;ther, 'upon the same principle, the n1aking of statements by a witness at a view, or even
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the pointing out of the places by a witness or
other unauthorized person at a view (\vhich
amounts to giving testimony) is a violation of
the rule. 1-Iere, also, the only question can be
\vhether the impropriety is, under the circumstances, sufficient ground for setting aside the
verdict.' 3 Wigmore on Ev., sec. 1802 ( 2). ''
(198 S. E. at 447.)
The Idaho Supren1e Court, in commenting upon the
appropriateness of parties attending the jury view and
conversing with the jury, in Alesko v. Union Pacific
Ry . ·co., 62 Ida. 235, 109 P. 2d 874, said:
''To obviate any such reoccurrence herein
the vie'v should be had only in the company and
presence of the attorneys, judge, and bailiff in
charge of the jury. Any interested parties, particularly appellant or witnesses, should not he
allo,x.red in the vicinity at the time of the vie"~,
or to talk with the jury."
In the case at bar, the re1narks of nirs. Christensen,
as disclosed by the affidavit of n[r. Faxon, resulted in
a plea of syn1pathy being ai1ued at the jury even before
the respondents had opened thPir ca8e: her re1narks and
retorts could not have been other,vise than prejudicial to
the interests of the State of Utah, coupled 'vith the fact
that they dealt 'vith elen1ents for 'vhich no recovery is
allowed. The lando,vners should not have been 'vith the
jury during the vie,\~ in the first instance. Their presence, standing alone, Inight not have been fa tal but the
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conversation carried on \vith the jury constituted express
prejudice, \Varranting reversal of the judgment.
POINT II
QUESTIONS ASKED BY COUNSEL FOR
RESPONDENTS ON CROSS- EXAMINATION OF WILBUR HARDING, WITH RESPECT TO SEVERANCE DA~IAGE PAID
BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANOTHER
LANDOWNER ALONG THE SAME HIGHWAY PROJECT, WERE PREJUDICIAL
AND INFLAMMATORY, AND THE STATE
OF UTAH WAS THEREBY DENIED A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
(A) The lower court committed prejudicial error

in overruling the initial objection of the
of Utah.

Stat~e

Testimony developed at the trial revealed little difference between the case of the respondents and that of
the State of Utah with respect to the appraised value of
the 0.54 acre required for the public improvement. The
witnesses for the landowners appraised the land taken
at $1,080. \'7ilbur Harding, expert for the State, evaluated the tract expropriated at $1,080; Edwin Stein appraised the tract at $620. The major issue under litigation centered about the quantum of damage attributed
to the remaining land of the respondents brought about
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by the condemnation of the 0.54 acre,
damage.

1.

e., severance

It \Vas "·ith respect to an aspect of severance damage (proximity of the highway facility to the remaining
land) that a series of questions were asked of Mr. Harding on cross examination by defendants' counsel which
branded the entire proceeding with an air of prejudice
and prevented a fair hearing from taking place. Such
examination had relation to the amount of severance
damage paid by the State of Utah to a neighboring property owner in settlement and the text of events is set
forth in the Statement of Facts herein, page 6. In determining the natural consequences of this line of examination, it is appropriate to consider the status of the
la \Y \vith respect thereto.
Testimony in connection \vith the sale of independent but con1parable property is admissible in this jurisdiction as an indirect measure of the fair value of the
property under consideration. So. Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State th'r'ough
its Engineering Commission v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265
P. 2d 630 ( 1953). Ho"~ever, in order that a sale be eligible for adn1issibility, it must be sho"rn that it was
a roluntary one, i. e., transacted between a willing
buyer and a w·illing seller. So. Pacific Ry~ Co. v. Arthur,
supra; Application of Cou,·rt of Ne~v York Authority,
et al., 28 N. J. Super. 575, 101 A. 2d 368. A sale that
is n1ade under threat, co1npulsion, or in1pending litiga-
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tion does not partake of voluntariness and involves a
buyer and/ or seller who is by implication, obligated to
enter into the agreement. Thus, it is said, with some
judicial unanimity of declaration, that a sale made between a landowner and a condemning authority may
not be received in evidence in a proceeding wherein the
condemnor seeks to acquire other lands. Weber County
v. Ritchie, 98 U. 272, 96 P. 2d 744 '(1939); U. 8. v. 13,255.53 Acr~es, 158 F. 2d 874, C. A. 3rd, ( 1946) ; City o.f
Los Angeles v. o·ole, 28 Cal. 2d 509, 170 P. 2d 928 (1946);
Cook County v. Draper, 387 Ill. 149, 56 N. E. 2d 410;
Dantzler v. 1llississippi State Highway Comm., 190 Miss.
137, 199 So. 367. The reasons for the exclusion of a sale
to a condemning authority is laid down by Nichols, Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, page 293, Sec. 21.33.
At the very outside, it might be apologetically argued that the questions directed to Mr. Harding by counsel for respondents related to the sale of comparable
property from a private landowner to the State of Utah
-a statistic, itself, that requires its rejection. In point
of fact, the inquiries were leveled at the amount of severance damage that the State of Utah had paid to the
landowner, "\Vhose property abutted the Christensen tract
on the \vest. By any standard, the questions w·ere improper and the measure of any test would find the examination highly inflammatory and prejudicial to the
public authority. It takes not an expert in land evaluation to dra'v the rather basic conclusion that severity of
severance damage on distinct parcels of property will
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never be parallel. The impact of a public taking on remaining tracts is a variable factor, dependent upon the
size of the condemned parcel, the size of the remaining
tract, the best use of the property, the angle of taking,
proximity of the public structure to private improvements, and a host of other elements. Under what principle of evidence were the series of questions propounded
to the State's witness, Harding~ It is submitted that
there is none, that the purpose of the examination was
to embarrass the State of Utah and its witness and to
allow the jury to infer therefrom.
This Court in Weber County v. Ritchie, supra, read
into the record its position concerning the admissibility
of severance damage paid by the public authority to another landowner :
''Appellants (landowner) offered in evidence
the testin1ony of another lando\\rner of the vicinity. They sought to prove the value of the Ritchie
land taken by proving \Yha t this other O\Yner had
received from the County for his land for the
san1e project. Ho\YPver, on voir dire it ,,~as disclosed that the sun1 of n1onev this lando"~er received included damages to olhis remaining land.
The court ruled out the testin1ony of this \Yitness
upon the ground that it \Yas not proper evidence
of value. Under the authorities \Ye think this \Yas
correct. Although the decisions divide upon the
question of admissibility of an1ounts paid by the
conden1nor for other lands, there is little disagreement that compro·Jnise settlements, including
damages, are not ad1nissible. The proposed tes-
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timony did not segregate the sale price from the
darnages. It is questionable whether the price,
had it been segregated, would have been proper
testimony under the definition of market value
as applicable to condemnation proceedings. * * * ''
( 96 P. 2d 744.) (Emphasis Ours.)
The net result of this line of examination is severalfold.
(1) The jury is to assume that there is some validity attached to the question. It is presumed that the
interrogatory, "Isn't it true, Mr. Harding * * *
that there was a severance of $3,500 paid to that owner
because of the proximity of this highway~'' propounded
by counsel, was not a figment of the imagination. By
line of succession, the succeeding presumption is that the
State of Utah paid the neighboring landowner $3,500 for
severance damage to his property but yet is only willing
to pay the Christensens a sum less than $500.
(2) Counsel for the State of Utah was placed on
the horns of a dilemna, in that an objection could either
be interposed to the line of questions, or in the alternative, counsel could remain silent. By raising an objection, the question of the cross examiner is given emphasis
and attention; the logical interpretation by the jury
from the objection made is that the State of Utah
is concealing information and does not want it to be
brought out. The objection, itself, inscribes the question
asked, in the minds of the jurors. The remaining alternative available to counsel for the State is, ipso facto,
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to remain silent and allow the question to come in without an objection. This approach, of course, opens the
door to a holocaust of irrelevant matter and is a poor
substitute for obtaining a fair hearing under the established rules of procedure. The State pursued the only
realistic approach by way of objections, and it should
not be subjected to a penalty of bearing the implications
of such objections.
(3) The witness, Harding, was unduly embarrassed
and it would be inferred, by the layman, that the witness
had not taken into consideration all the comparable sales
of property in the vicinity of the condemned tract. It is
improper to present to a witness a question which has
no factual basis and to pursue further examination predicated thereon. Bragg v. C. E. Whitten Transfer ·c·o., 125
W.Va. 722, 26 S. E. 2d 217.
In Ent~inger v. Se£gler, 186 S. C. 194, 195 S. E.
244 (1938), a case wherein counsel for the defendant
persisted in pursuing a line of questioning not only
irrelevant but also prejudicial, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina cited the problem facing opposing counsel:

''It is plain that this testn11ony could in no
'vay have enlightened the jury on any legitin1ate
issue in the controversy. It is equally clear that
these questions tended to seriously prejudice the
plaintiff's case before the jury. And 'vhere the
damage done is ineradicable, the presence of good
faith or inadvertence is of little moment.
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''While it is true that the objections interposed to the questions complained of were sustained, yet by reason of that very fact, they may
have been, and probably were, the more prejudicial to the plaintiff. * * * By objection and
by argument, the matter was particularly called
to the attention of the jury. The probable and,
no doubt, logical result of improper questioning
is to give the jury the impression that the facts
assumed actually exist, and that the reason why
the opposite party objects to the questions is that
he is trying to keep such facts from the jury.''
In the instant situation, the objection to the initial
question of counsel for respondents was overruled by
the court ( Tr. 200).
This was prejudicial error because the ruling suggested that the substance of the question was proper.
The entire line of questioning engaged by counsel for
respondents with relation to severance damage paid by
the State was of such a nature that their prejudicial
effect was not erased thereafter.
(B) Su.ch questions .were asked in bad faith and
their prejudicial effect was not cured.

The attempt of counsel for respondents to inject,
into the legitimate pursuits of the trial, interrogatories
relating to severance paid to another landowner along
the same highway project, resulted in a denial of a fair
and impartial trial. The train of questions, beginning at
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Tr. 200, Line 7 and continuing to Tr. 201, Line 6, were
pointed toward the same matter, only the phraseology
being different. Three of the questions 'vere propounded
by respondents' counsel after an objection thereto had
been sustained. This venture may only be classified as
performed in bad faith.
The courts of this country relentlessly condemn efforts of counsel to utilize the courtroom as a weapon
against the adversary by inserting unfounded and improper questions into the hearing. Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S. \V. 352. Thus, it is
announced in 39 Am. J ur. 80, New Trial, Sec. 65:
'' lVIisconduct of counsel may consist in atteinpting to get before the jury matters not in
issue and not properly matters for the consideration of the jury by means of asking witnesses improper questions or making improper offers of
proof. In recent years there has been a decided
increase in the nun1ber of cases in "rhich complaint has been made of prejudice suffered by
rPason of such misconduct, and frequently a new
trial is sought and granted on this ground, particularly 'vhere an attorney persistently pursues
a "Tholly unjustified and prejudicial course of
interrogation, not,vithstanding the objections n1ade
by counsel for the opposing party litigant and
sustained by the court. * * * ,\. . hile the
granting or \vi thholding of the desired relief is
to be determined 'vith a vie"T to the effect of the
facts which have been brought to the jury's attention, 1nany authorities hold that a ne'Y trial
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will be ordered where it appears that counsel for
the prevailing party solicited improper answers
from a witness or pursued an improper and prejudicial course of interrogation, for example,
where incompetent questions which assume the
existence of damaging facts have been put with
such persistency as to make it evident that the
questions, and not the answers, are considered
important. So, it will constitute ground for a new
trial if counsel, in disregard of the court's ruling
that a certain line of evidence is inadmissible,
persists in attempting to get such evidence before
the jury, to the prejudice of the unsuccessful party. As has been pointed out, in many instances
of Inisconduct in propounding questions concerning matters which counsel has no right to inquire
into, the opposing counsel, if he makes objection,
is necessarily placed in the false light of suppressing significant evidence and attempting to deceive the jury into rendering an unjust verdict.
The good or bad faith of counsel, and the extent
of his bad faith where it exists, are elements to
be taken into consideration, but are not necessarily controlling; good faith is not a shield to a
litigant whose counsel seriously errs in the matter
under consideration.''
See also Johns v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 86 P. 2d 605
(1939); McCrae v. McCoy, 214 S. C. 343, 52 S. E. 2d
403; Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N. D. 708, 193 N. \V. 312.
It is of no moment to say that, of the six questions asked
by counsel for the respondents, the lower court sustained
an objection to five of them. The law is "\veil settled that
a party engaged in prejudicial examination may not
defend against a plea for new trial on the theory that
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the objections were sustained to his questions. Entzminger v. Seigler, supra; 88 C. J. S. 329, Trial, Sec.
162 (b). It is interesting to note that counsel for respondents never made any offer of proof, whatsoever, in connection with the amount of severance damage allegedly
paid to the neighbor by the State of Utah; interesting
to note that the name of the landowner abutting the
Christens ens' tract on the west was never mentioned by
counsel for respondents; interesting to note that nothing was said relative to the type of property for which
the severance damage payment was allegedly made.
Counsel's statement of $3,500 stands alone and unfounded by fact.
It could be well argued, and is submitted herein, that
the jury verdict of $4,420 for severance damage reflects
the effect of the improper examination of counsel.

POINT III
REFUSAL OF THE LO~~R COURT TO
RECEIVE E'TIDENCE, ON BEHALF OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, RELATING TO
ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AT OR ABOUT THE
DATE OF CONDE~INATION, WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Testi1nony of the respondents, brought forth during
their case in chief, asserted that the property of the re-
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spondents, at the date of condemnation, was zoned by
American Fork City so that the sheep business conducted
upon the Christensen premises constituted a non-conforming use; and that the reason the respondents could
not utilize the coops on the remaining property for a
poultry operation \vas that the zoning regulations prohibited such use. The State of Utah, to establish its. own
case in connection with the value of the property before
and after the taking, a.nd to reb'ltt the case of respondents, offered to prove that the zoning ordinances of
American Fork City at the date set for assessment of
compensation did not forbid the application and devotion of the Christensen property for the chicken business; that, in actuality, the zoning ordinance which respondents relied on was enacted and effective several
months after January of 1960 (Tr. 175 and 222). The
lower court sustained objections to the testimony of both
~Ir. Harding and Mr. Stein in this regard and, in so
doing, committed prejudicial error. The objectives, as
explained to the lower court (Tr. 176), in introducing
evidence concerning the ordinance passed after the date
of condemnation, were:
(1) To a.id in the determination of the gravity
of severance damage. The ordinance prohibited use
of the respondents' property for either sheep, poultry, or dairy operation so that the use of the respondents' property for pasturing sheep was, at
best, non-conforming. In turn, this was indicative
of a change in the highest and best use of the prop-
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erty from a small farming operation to a residential
plat within the municipality.
(2) To rebut the case of respondents. The witnesses for respondents, without exception, including
the lando"'rners themselves, testified that, as of January 18, 1960, the ordinance restricting the use of
the condemned tract was in effect. The fact of the
matter refuted this testimony.
It is submitted that this testimony should have been
received not only for rebuttal, but also to establish the
case of the State. Malia, et al. v. Seeley, 89 U. 262, 57
P. 2d 357 (1936); 1 Wigmore on the Law of Evidence,
3rd Ed., 425, Sec. 34 ;· 88 ·C.. J. S. 212, Trial, Sec. 101.
The fact that the State "\\7as thwarted in its efforts to
accomplish both resulted in prejudice to its interests.
POINT

nr

INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT \VAS AN INCORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The lo'\ver court in its instruction to the jury on determination of severance damage stated:
"Instruction No. 7
"You are instructed that when a parcel of
land is taken by eminent don1ain, the owner is not
restricted to compensation for the land actually
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taken; he is also entitled to Tecover for the damage, if any, to his remaining land. These damages
may include such items as the cutting of remaining land into irregular or inconvenient shapes,
cutting off access to a highway, annoyances frorn
no~ise, /vibrations, dust, odors, obstruction of view,
and lessened value of the' remainder as a site for
the purposes for which the land was being used.
''You are further instructed that the use of,
accommodation for pasturing, protecting and
keeping sheep for general purposes and for sheering and lambing in season in connection with the
owner's sheep business op.eration, to which the
property was being put to at the time of taking
by the State Road Commission of Utah, are elements to be considered in fixing the damages, if
any, to the remaining land of the defendant."
(Emphasis Ours.)
Instruction No. 7 is inaccurate, misleading, and a
misstatement of the law, relating to damages compensable under the laws of eminent domain. First of all,
the second sentence of such instruction draws to the
attention of the jury specific elements of damage and
tends to elucidate and emphasize particular factors. An
instruction stressing individual evidentiary rna tters is
considered improper, for it amounts to a comment on the
evidence by the court. Meecham, v . .Allen, 1 U. 2d 285,
262 P. 2d 285 (1953); .Addy v. Ste-tvart, 207 P. 2d 498
(Ida. 1949) .
The instruction further charges the jury that it may
consider, as severance damage, cutting off access to a
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highway. The testimony in the case is altogether clear
that the acquisition of the .54 acre by the State and the
construction of the public improvement did not limit or
restrict any access to the defendants' property, which
he enjoyed prior to the taking. While it is true that the
highway facility is designated as a limited access improvement (the freeway is a new highway), the abutting
landowner has no right of access to it, and no compensation may be awarded for tl1e restriction of access.
City of Los J.4ngeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App. 2d 348,
210 P. 2d }17 (1949); Schnider v. State of California, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P. 2d 1 (1952) ; State Hightvay Department v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783
(1954); State Highway Department v. Calkins, 50 Wash.
2d 716, 314 P. 2d 449 (1957).
Further evidence of error In said instruction is
found in the second sentence thereof, for it authorizes
the jury to consider other factors, which have no supporting basis in the transcript or the testimony adduced
at the trial. Pointedly, there was no evidence subn1itted
by the respondents relative to the depreciation in the
value of the remaining property, caused by vibrations
from the public improven1ent, nor was there evidence
indicating· that dust accumulations would lessen the
value of the remaining tract. An instruction given, which
does not find its basis upon testimony produced and
received at the trial is i1nproper and prejudicial. M ehr
v. Child, et al., 90 U. 348, 61 P. 2d 624 (1936) ; Mantonya
v. Bratlie, et al., 33 Cal. 2d 120, 199 P. 2d 677 (1948).
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With respect to that part of the instruction concerned with the compensability for obstruction of view,
it is submitted that the law of eminent domain in this
jurisdiction does not recognize such, for the factor is
aesthetic in nature, and does not affect substantive land
values. A landowner does not have an easement of view
across neighboring property and the State of Utah may
construct upon the land it acquires such in1provements
as it sees fit, without compensating the abutting property
owner, so long as easements of air and light are not
unreasonably restricted. (Concurring opinion in State
Road Comm.ission v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P. 2d
276.)
The second sentence of Instruction No. 7 directs the
jury that, in determining severance damage, it may consider the effect of the acquisition of the State Road Commission upon the owners' ~sheep business operation and
the use of the land for shearing and lambing. The conclusion is manifest that said instruction relates to the
business operation of the respondents, conducted upon
the land prior to the filing of the complaint of the State
of Utah, and the effect that the condemnation had upon
business. Little time need be spent in citing authorities
to this Court that loss of profits or prospecti¥e damages
to a business concern are not compensable elements in
eminent domain. State v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495
(1957). The business is distinct from the value of the
remaining tract. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume
4, p. 255, Sec. 13.3.
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The instruction, in its entirety, was erroneous and
the jury was allowed to consider elements not compensable and not a part of the lawsuit.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court, by reason of error
committed during the trial of the matter, should be reversed and remanded to such court for new trial on the
issues of compensation.
Respectflilly submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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